

Message Text

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ORIGIN ARA-10

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ABF-01 /039 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/MGT:KDACKERMAN:HP

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S/S-0:JLHOGANSON

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P 270033Z MAR 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069107

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AR

SUBJECT: COUNTER-TERRORIST PROGRAM BUENOS AIRES

REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 1861; (B) STATE 063519

1. DEPARTMENT IS EVALUATING RECOMMENDATIONS 1(A) AND 1(B),
REF. A, AND WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DATA REQUESTED PARA 6
BELOW TO COMPLETE THE ANALYSIS AND REACH DECISIONS. OUR
INITIAL COSTCALCULATIONS FOR THESE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS ARE
THAT THEY WOULD ADD APPROXIMATELY DOLS. 873,120 FOR PERSONAL
GUARD SERVICE AND DOLS. 93,000 FOR PATROL CARS TO ANNUAL
ANTI-TERRORISM COSTS. (WE ESTIMATE GUARD SERVICE ON THE
BASIS OF 68 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO BE GUARDED. WE ARRIVE
AT THIS FIGURE BY STARTING WITH YOUR STRENGTH FIGURE OF
123, SUBTRACTING 17 STILL SCHEDULED FOR DEPARTURE UNDER
NOVEMBER REDUCTION; SUBTRACTING 17 MARINE GUARDS WHOSE
RESIDENCE WE ASSUME IS PROVIDED ONE GUARD ONLY, AND FINALLY,
SUBTRACTING 31 ALREADY PROVIDED STATIC GUARDS. NET INCREASE
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IN PERSONNEL TO BE PROVIDED STATIC GUARDS WAS THEN MULTI-

PLIED BY YOUR ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST.)

2. ASSUME EMBASSY AGREES THAT ADDED GUARDS COULD PROVIDE ONLY SOME MEASURE OF DETERRENCE TO TERRORIST ACTS, BUT NO GUARANTEE OF PROTECTION TO ANY INDIVIDUAL IN THE MISSION. THIS, COUPLED WITH FACT THAT ESTIMATED ANTI-TERRORIST COSTS IN B.A. ARE ALREADY RUNNING AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF DOLS. 1,130,000, INCLUDING DOLS. 780,000 FOR GUARDS AND PATROLS, FORCES DEPARTMENT TO PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION THAT ALTERNATIVES TO SHARPLY INCREASING GUARD FORCE AT GREAT COST, MUST BE PURSUED. WE ARE THINKING PARTICULARLY OF FURTHER TEMPORARY REDUCTIONS IN MISSION PERSONNEL, EVEN IF SOME IMPORTANT U.S. OBJECTIVES IN ARGENTINA MUST BE SACRIFICED, AND ALSO, THAT CONCERTED EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO COLOCATE PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS IN APARTMENTS WHERE EQUAL OR BETTER PERSONAL SECURITY COULD BE PROVIDED AT REDUCED COSTS. DEPARTMENT URGES CONTINUED EMBASSY PLANNING IN THESE DIRECTIONS, BUT WILL AWAIT RECEIPT OF DATA REQUESTED PARA 6 BEFORE MAKING FINAL DECISIONS ON PARAS 1(A) AND 1(B) REF. A.

3. THE PROPOSED ARMING OF ALL OFFICIAL VEHICLES WITH SHOTGUNS HAS BEEN VIEWED WITH CONSIDERABLE TREPIDATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN HAVE EMERGED:

(A) HOW DOES EMBASSY PROPOSE TO CONTROL WEAPONS PLACED IN VEHICLES?

(B) SINCE, OBVIOUSLY, ALL POST PERSONNEL ARE NOT TRAINED IN THE DISCIPLINED USE OF SHOTGUNS, HOW WOULD POST INSURE THE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS OF SUCH VEHICLES?

(C) CONSIDERING SHOTGUN SIZE AND RATHER CLOSE QUARTERS IN BACK SEAT OF VEHICLE CARRYING THREE, OR EVEN TWO, PASSENGERS, WOULD NOT THE LIMITED MANEUVERING SPACE NEGATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH A WEAPON? GIVEN THESE CONDITIONS, WOULD THE SHOTGUN NOT REPRESENT A POSSIBLE LIABILITY RATHER THAN AN ASSET AGAINST A TERRORIST ASSAULT?

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(D) WILL KNOWLEDGE THAT VEHICLES ARE WEAPON-EQUIPPED (WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONCEAL), RENDER OCCUPANTS MORE VULNERABLE TO FIRE ATTACK RATHER THAN ATTEMPTED ABDUCTION OR OTHER FORMS OF TERRORIST ACTION?

(E) SINCE FOR EFFECTIVENESS SUCH WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED IN LOADED STATE, HAS EMBASSY FULLY CONSIDERED THE LEGAL (AND PERHAPS POLITICAL) RAMIFICATIONS SHOULD AN

INNOCENT BYSTANDER BE KILLED OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED DUE TO AN ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE?

4. AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO EQUIPPING WITH SHOTGUNS, POST SHOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING VEHICLES WITH NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SUCH AS MACE AND/OR TEAR GAS. OTHER ALTERNATIVES, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THESE, TOO, MIGHT BE TO

INSTITUTE SMALL CONVOY-TYPE MOVEMENTS WITH A TRAINED AND HAND-GUN EQUIPPED PASSENGER IN EACH VEHICLE. A HAND GUN WOULD BE EASIER TO CONCEAL AND CONTROL.

5. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE CONDUCT THOROUGH RECONSIDERATION OF THE SHOTGUN PROPOSAL IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING FACTORS BEFORE FINAL DECISION IS TAKEN.

6. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING FOLLOWING INFORMATION SOONEST:

(A) BREAKDOWN BY AGENCY AND COST OF CURRENT STATIC GUARD SERVICE PRESENTLY BEING PROVIDED TO 31 MISSION PERSONNEL.

(B) SAME BREAKDOWN AS IN (A) FOR THE ADDITIONAL 68 PERSONNEL WHICH SWC RECOMMENDS BE PROVIDED STATIC GUARD SERVICE.

(C) WHAT DOES PROPOSED DOLS. 93,000 FOR 3 NEW PATROL CARS INCLUDE? RECOMMENDATION PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO TALK MANPOWER BUT COMMENT SPEAKS TO 3 ADDITIONAL VEHICLES.

(D) WHAT RATE OF EXCHANGE WAS USED TO CALCULATE THE DOLLAR COSTS OF THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN REF. A?

7. IN DETAIL, ENTIRE TERRORISM INFORMATION WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL

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REQUIRED FOR BUDGET FY 1975 AND 1976 AND WILL BE REQUESTED BY SEPTTEL.

8. DEPT PREPARED SEND SEABEE PERSONNEL INSTALL LIGHT ARMOR IN OFFICIAL VEHICLES UPON RECEIPT B.A. 40 ALUMINUM KITS.

9. PROCUREMENT STATUS OF DISGUISED RADIO ANTENNAS, REQUESTED PARA 1(C) REF. A, PROVIDED PARA 5, REF. B. KISSINGER

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